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Introduction
The fact that the United States will continue to conduct military operations with coalition partners is a given. What makes that endeavor operationally challenging is the fact that the United States has a significant technological military capability and an overwhelming defense budget by international standards. Even when looking at many of these nations' budgets combined, there is still a shortage of spending when compared to the United States. Recent operations have identified several ally shortfalls that need to be corrected. Efforts are under way to address these interoperability and capability challenges. In the end, unless U.S. partners boost defense spending, their ability to participate with the United States in military operations will continue to be challenging for quite some time.
The Necessity of Coalition Operations
The requirement for U.S. forces to anticipate working closely with foreign partners is alliance military forces. These are but a few of the many multinational operations that have occurred since one of the largest coalitions in recent history was used in 1991 in the first Gulf War.
The latest major conflict, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, was preceded by a significant effort by the United States to gain international participation. Whether that was done for political legitimacy, economic reasons, anticipated post-conflict challenges or military necessity, the amount of press coverage prior to the war showed how much critical attention the international arena was paying to who was "in" and who was "out" of the coalition.
In anticipation of multinational operations, the United States has even developed joint doctrine with "multinational" directly within the title.
2 Other U.S. joint doctrine publications include chapters dedicated specifically to multinational operations. 3 The United States continues to support International Military Education and Training (IMET) and exchange programs with numerous countries throughout the world. A fairly recent National Defense Universitysponsored study highlighted the need for coalition partners, pointing out that without sufficient international backing, the United States, with its pre-Gulf War II buildup, "runs the risk of generating more sympathy for Iraqi people than animus for the Iraqi regime." 4 Many now in hindsight would take exactly that same position. The study further indicates that other nations may just be waiting for the United States to take care of major problems, and once the economic benefits begin to appear, these nations will be more than willing to participate. The study goes on to say that the Europeans may be claiming similar international goals, but don't back up those goals with appropriate policies or capabilities.
In recent moves in the positive direction, the upcoming expansion of NATO from 19 na- tiative, the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council highlight the increased emphasis on multinational involvement, both on the political and the military side. All this may be good news, but the reality of foreign military capabilities leaves plenty of room for improvement.
The Technology Gap in Coalition Operations
Within the past ten years, widespread dialogue and press reports point to a significant technology gap between U.S. forces and other nations. One of the most recent studies undertaken seems to indicate that the gap is more a capabilities gap than a technological one. 5 Other studies confirm ally technology is not keeping up. When it comes to allied efforts toward digitization as a way to adapt to the U.S. Army Force XXI capability, "even the most advanced NATO allies have not been able to keep up with the multiple U.S. Army digitization plans." 6 Significant discussion of a gap began shortly after the Kosovo Campaign in the spring of 1999. As the war over Serbia was taking place, studies were pointing out that significant reductions in defense spending, around 25 percent, had taken place since the end of the Cold War 7 .
Defense planners indicated that "only a handful of Europe's notional forces are really available for the kind of missions NATO is likely to undertake" and one example pointed out that out of 5,000 European military aircraft theoretically able to carry out air strikes, only 10 percent were capable of precision bombing. 8 Even though Europeans had been more concerned with sensitivity of certain targets during the war, they had little military capability to operate in accordance such separation. Even the latest Gulf War saw a geographic separation of the smallest of coalitions with the British taking the southeastern sector of Iraq and U.S. forces concentrating on the remainder. The reasons for that arrangement have yet to emerge from the classified reports, but capability gaps due to technological differences in communication equipment, inter alia, are likely to be one of the major aspects.
If the United States can't operate effectively in a coalition with its NATO allies, working closely with other nations will only become even more challenging.
The Gap Isn't Getting Any Smaller
Post-9/11, the gap appears to continue growing. A major part of the problem is a lack of proper investment in defense. General Ralston pointed this out when discussing progress on DCIs, relating that he felt NATO discussions were "more rhetoric than reality."
15 Differences in modernization budgets and priorities are increasing and "The technology gap that characterized past operations will continue to grow." 16 The gap is continuing to widen, as shown by the fact that both the investment in science and technology (S&T)-or research and development (R&D), depending on definitions-and overall defense spending continue to be quite disparate between
Europe and the United States.
The early development of the gap can be related to overall defense spending as far back as 1980. Since that time, the United States has continued to outspend the rest of NATO. Using data from the reference for total. 19 And much of the European S&T budget is spent on each country's needs, resulting in much duplication occurring when every nation is doing research to build a better bullet. Taking a look at the transatlantic comparisons of R&D versus the overall defense budget, the United
States has spent about 14 percent of its total defense budget on this area, whereas the rest of NATO averages no better than 3 percent on R&D for the period 1996-2001. 20 The recently released U.S. President's defense budget for FY2005 is asking for $69B, pushing the U.S. percentage dedicated to transformational technologies up to 17 percent. 21 Assuming again that normal inflation is used to adjust the present and projected NATO R&D budget, their figure would not even come to $10B. With this disparity, it is hard to imagine any plausible way that the rest of NATO could even assume it has a chance to keep pace with the United States or even close the technology or capabilities gap. It is true that there may be some hidden funds within the rest of NATO that are not accounted for, but unless another $60B is uncovered, the gap with the United
States is going to get worse quickly.
Now one must keep in mind that U.S. spending is probably higher because it is based on operating from the North American continent. Also a significant number of its forces are stationed overseas, essentially pre-positioned for any emerging conflicts. But this budgetary analysis does not even include the supplemental funds that are used to fight the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which added $65B for military spending in 2004 alone.
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Now, the rest of NATO may still think they are doing fine by looking at percentage of GDP they spent on defense (see Table 2 ); the discussions revolving around Table 1 
Impact of the Technology Gap
Recent coalition operations have been lauded by commanders and the press alike as the key to effective operations and the modern recipe for success. On the battlefield it's the proper mixture of capabilities brought to bear at the correct time and in the correct proportions that leads to success. Some huge differences in defense spending and technological advances of U.S. historical coalition partners have been noted; these differences have manifested themselves several ways both during preconflict planning and during the fray. Without going into each coalitioninvolved operation, some lessons can be proven to be cross-cutting in nature. A few comments on one of the more recent coalition operations highlight the overall theme. A quick look at the percentage of sorties flown in Operation ALLIED FORCE by U.S. versus non-U.S. aircraft in In a coalition environment, the gathering and dissemination of coherent information is not a trivial pursuit, and is often the first sign of true interoperability. point targets and the media was closely watching for collateral damage. 35 During that operation, only the United States had all-weather strike capability in the form of the JDAM 2,000-lb. GPSguided weapon.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
In the first Gulf War, it was the overall shortage of assets outside those of the United-
States that showed how far behind all U.S. allies had drifted. In Bosnia, a few more countries emerged with capabilities, but the ability to share that collected data or the support to analyze that data was quite lacking. In Kosovo, the release of imagery or location data took up to 72
hours, so the process had not improved. 36 But the French felt that tactical reconnaissance aircraft, for which Europe has the advantage, were more valuable than American satellite coverage.
The United States probably prefers assets that are out of reach of enemy air defense weapons, so the continued use of drones/UAVs in the near future is the likely U.S. plan.
Strategic Lift
Strategic airlift continues to be a major shortfall for NATO allies. They lack the capability to airlift large amounts of personnel and equipment beyond their borders. France has bought the C-160, as well as cargo versions of the DC-8. 37 The U.K. is also leasing C-17s from the United States with plans for a possible replacement such as the Airbus A400M program, which is in the initial stages of planning. Scheduled for initial delivery in 2009, this program has attracted signatures from 14 nations from within NATO. 38 On the naval side, allies lack "sufficient rollon, roll-off transport ships to move heavy forces quickly."
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Aerial Tankers
Aerial refueling allows today's forces to both "play the away game" by giving them "long legs," but also allows strike aircraft to loiter longer on the battlefield, awaiting time- 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD)
The only allies who could contribute beyond the United States to the SEAD mission were Germany and Italy. The German and Italian Tornados were shooters in the SEAD mission, firing their antiradiation missiles at the surface-to-air missile sites as they turned their radars on.
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The biggest weakness within NATO-Europe is the lack of any radar jamming capability. The NRF is expected to number some 21,000 troops. It is designed to possess the full spectrum of warfighting capabilities and to be self-sustainable for 30 days. With a goal of being ready to deploy within five days' notice, it is an aggressive initiative.
Efforts Under Way to Close the Gap
The NRF concept was endorsed at the Prague Summit, held in November 2002, and approved by the North Atlantic Council on 12 June 03. The purpose of the force is to provide NATO with a robust and credible high readiness capability, which is fully trained and certified as a joint and combined arms force able to deploy quickly to participate in the full spectrum of NATO missions wherever required, expeditionary in character and design.
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Focusing NATO on this NRF concept will emphasize expeditionary capabilities such as ISR, remote communications, deployability and sustainability-all areas in which NATO Europe currently has limited capability. So the side effect of signing up to the NRF concept should force nations to modernize their current military force structure in a direction similar to U.S. capabilities.
Present Expertise, International Peacekeeping
Currently, one of the greatest military capabilities that U.S. Allies retain is the ability to carry out combined peacekeeping. The NATO Alliance countries are practiced and efficient in this role. They have demonstrated this combined capability in many places, including several with the United States, notably in Bosnia and Kosovo. In August 2003, NATO took a landmark step by taking over the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. This was the first time NATO had headed a security operation outside of Europe.
53 Combined interoperability in the peacekeeping role is a proven NATO strength.
The Closest U.S. Military Ally
The nation maintaining the closest military interoperability with the United States is Great Britain. It recognizes the need for continued compatibility with U.S. and NATO forces and strives in all areas to maintain it. Iraqi Operations Lessons Learned repeatedly cite advantages such as, "The RAF's ability to integrate seamlessly with the U.S. Air Force reflected 12 years of operating together in the no-fly zones over Iraq." 54 This statement is closely mirrored in U.S. lessons learned. 55 The British were able to closely match interoperability in both naval and ground warfare as well in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. They deployed their largest amphibious force since 1982. 56 They also deployed over 28,000 ground troops and eventually incorporated forces from nine countries into the Multi National Division in what they call Operation TELIC.
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Great Britain seeks to retain future interoperability though cooperative acquisition as well. For example, the British are planning two fixed-wing aircraft carriers, which they refer to as CVFs (carrier, fixed-wing, future) to reach their fleet in 2012. This timeframe coincides with the expected arrival of their version of the joint strike fighter (JSF). 58 The degree of cooperation that the British participation in the JSF program demonstrates is rare, but will assure a significant level of interoperability in combat air operations.
Great Britain is without a doubt the United States' most militarily interoperable Ally. It maintains this level of interoperability through extensive interaction in both peacetime and con- Great Britain has made itself the lowest common denominator in combined military operations.
NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI)
A watershed event occurred in April 1999 when the NATO defense ministers formally adopted Defence Capabilities Initiatives and established a High-Level Steering Group to foster the implementation of these 58 initiatives within the Alliance to improve the interoperability, deployability, and sustainability of NATO forces. 59 DCIs were a regular part of the annual NATO planning process during which member nations report the steps they are taking to improve their military forces. Since major additional defense spending among most of the allies is highly unlikely, the force planning process must adopt ways to prioritize the objectives the Alliance really wants its members to accomplish, such as deployability and sustainability. DCIs sought to 
Prague Capability Commitment (PCC) and Other Organizational Efforts
The follow-on to the DCIs came out of the Prague Summit. Renamed the Prague Capability Commitments, the number of initiatives was reduced to focus attention to areas deemed most important. NATO also has other organizations within that are focused on improving interoperability. The NATO Standardisation Agency (NSA) is responsible for ensuring that standards are published so that nations have something on which to base their designs as well as electrical and communications interfaces. Over 1,300 Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs) exist and most nations use these when acquiring or designing capabilities. To help with basic research as nations attempt to focus on emerging capabilities that will be required in the future, the Research Technology Organisation (RTO) works to consolidate S&T efforts of many of the nations and has five boards that help steer limited funding in the proper direction. Once nations determine that they will acquire new equipment, another organization in NATO can aid in that aspect as well. The Conference of National Armaments Directorates (CNAD) has numerous working groups within to help maximize procurement dollars by acquiring similar or even identical equipment so that it is interoperable at least from the equipment (a.k.a. armaments in NATO-speak) side of things. In an analysis of the military operations in Kosovo, however, there was still much criticism of NATO efforts to modernize:
One obvious problem was a widening gap in capabilities between U.S. and other NATO air forces.... Moreover, despite fifty years of standardization efforts, NATO forces still exhibited significant interoperability problems. NATO heads of state launched a {DCI} during the Washington Summit in April 1999 to improve capacity, but declining or stagnating European defense budgets could make some problems intractable.
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The United States also participates in similar organizations outside of NATO, especially with the Australians, New Zealanders, and usually in cooperation with the Canadians and the U.K., an example of which is the American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies' Stan-61 Bruce R. Nardulli, RAND, MR-1406, p. 47. dardization Program (ABCA). 62 The common native language helps make for faster progress in several instances. Europe General James Jones also emphasized the desire to have the new member-nations of NATO contribute more to specialty areas of chemical and biological response as well as focused logistics. 71 The British SAS, mine-clearing, and photo reconnaissance capabilities are also niche capabilities on which the United States will continue to rely. If more nations can develop capabilities in other special areas, they can then become key contributors to multinational operations on the high end of the spectrum of warfare. If not, then they will be left with operations on the lower end.
Conclusion
Even with all of the above examples of interoperability initiatives, the fact remains that only the British come close to the United States' operational military capabilities. Other NATO nations cannot keep up with U.S. technological capabilities across the spectrum of warfare. With the impending NATO expansion, the overall NATO ability to maintain technical parity will be diluted further.
While credible military contributions can be made by America's allies, many of these are at the low end of the spectrum of military operations such as peacekeeping. The increasing technology gap means the United States must be prepared to perform warfighting at the high end of the spectrum of conflict with limited allied participation, at least for the near future.
There is, however, light at the end of the tunnel in the form of substantial and focused ini- All these efforts will help, but the bottom line is that past and current defense budget disparities between the United States and the rest of the world will keep the technology and capabilities gap at best on an even keel. Today, role specialization appears to be the best way forward. U.S. allies can, and need to, do more if they want to continue to play in the political arena of the world as well. 
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